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This paper analyzes the optimal adjustment strategy of an inventory-holding firm facing 
price- and quantity-adjustment costs in an inflationary environment. The model nests both the 
original menu-cost model that allows production to be costlessly adjusted, and the later model 
that includes price- and quantity-adjustment costs, but rules out inventory holdings. It is 
shown that the firm’s optimal adjustment strategy may involve stockouts. At low inflation 
rates, output is inversely related to the inflation rate, and the length of time demand is 
satisfied increases with the demand elasticity but decreases with the storage cost and the real 
interest rate. 
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Fixed price-adjustment costs, often called menu costs, play a central role in many explana-
tions of how monetary changes are transmitted and have real eﬀects. Owing to these costs,
it may be optimal for a monopolistic ﬁrm to keep its current nominal price unchanged, even
though this price diﬀers from the static proﬁt-maximizing price. In fact, the theoretical
literature has demonstrated that in the face of seemingly minor price-adjustment costs, a
fully anticipated inﬂation may increase average output and welfare if consumers are well
informed about prices (Danziger, 1988), but may lead to costly search and decrease welfare
if they are not (Benabou, 1988).1
There is direct empirical evidence that ﬁxed price-adjustment costs are non-trivial (Levy
et al., 1997; Zbaracki et al., 2004).2 However, recognizing the existence of ﬁxed price-
adjustment costs does not mean that other adjustment costs can be ignored. One particular
shortcoming of most of the theoretical literature is the implicit assumption that while it is
costly to adjust the nominal price, it is costless to adjust the production. However, such
asymmetry between price- and quantity-adjustment costs is not well founded. For instance,
Bresnahan and Ramey (1994) document the existence of ﬁxed costs of quantity adjustment
which may be due to the loss of organizational capital and other internal adjustment costs
incurred when inputs are rearranged in order to accommodate output changes (Baily et al.,
2001; Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2001). There is also ample evidence of the existence of ﬁxed
costs of adjusting labor (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992; Hamermesh, 1989; Caballero et al.,
1997; Abowd and Kramarz, 2003), and of adjusting capital (Doms and Dunne, 1998; Cooper
et al., 1999; Nilsen and Schiantarelli, 2003).
The presence of quantity-adjustment costs in addition to price-adjustment costs signif-
icantly aﬀects the response to a fully anticipated inﬂation. Speciﬁcally, if the quantity-
1 The eﬀects of monetary shocks are studied in Akerlof and Yellen (1985); Mankiw (1985); Blanchard and
Kiyotaki (1987); and Ball and Romer (1990). Recent contributions consider, among other things, models
in which idiosyncratic shocks impinge on price-adjustment costs (Dotsey et al., 1999), and on productivity
(Danziger, 1999; Golosov and Lucas, 2007).
2 It is also well established that the nominal prices of various goods are kept unchanged for substantial
periods, even at high inﬂation rates when the erosion of real prices can be considerable (Cecchetti, 1986;
Danziger, 1987; Kashyap, 1995; Fisher and Konieczny, 2006). Needless to say, nominal price stickiness need
not originate from ﬁxed price-adjustment costs, but may be caused by other factors, such as signalling and
strategic interactions.
1adjustment cost at least equals the price-adjustment cost, Danziger (2001) has shown that
average output and welfare are lower with a moderate inﬂa t i o nt h a nw i t hf u l lp r i c es t a -
bility, and inﬂation is therefore harmful. Furthermore, Danziger and Kreiner (2002) have
shown that quantity-adjustment costs amplify the eﬀects of price-adjustment costs.3 How-
ever, while these later papers provide a more satisfactory modelling of the adjustment costs
f a c i n gat y p i c a lﬁrm than the earlier literature, they themselves are incomplete since they
abstract from inventory holdings by assuming that any unsold output is destroyed. Unless
the output is completely perishable, inventories are an inevitable consequence of quantity-
adjustment costs. A more realistic assumption would be that ﬁrms may hold unsold output
as inventory for later sale, with the pricing and production decisions naturally taking this
into account.
The purpose of this paper is therefore to analyze the behavior of a ﬁrm that produces
a storable good and faces ﬁxed price- and quantity-adjustment costs in an environment
with a constant inﬂation rate. Keeping goods in inventory may be costly. If the quantity-
adjustment cost at least equals the price-adjustment cost, the optimal strategy entails that
the ﬁrm keeps its nominal price unchanged in periods of equal length and production at a
permanent level. At the beginning of a period, the real price is so high that there is unsold
output and the ﬁrm accumulates inventory. Later in the period, the real price has fallen
enough that demand exceeds current production and the ﬁrm runs down the inventory.
A ﬁrm’s inventory may be depleted before the end of a period with a constant nominal
p r i c e .S t o c k o u t so c c u ra tb o t hl o wa n dh i g hi n ﬂation rates.4 I nt h ec a s eo fl o wi n ﬂation
rates, the period with a constant nominal price is then so long that it would be too costly
to produce and store enough at the beginning of the period to have suﬃcient inventory
available to satisfy all the demand at the end. Furthermore, production will be shown to
decrease with the inﬂation rate, and the length of time demand is satisﬁed to increase with
the demand elasticity and decrease with the storage cost and the real interest rate.
The paper will make clear that the optimality conditions are diﬀerent from the case
3 Andersen (1995) shows that a small shock may leave output unchanged, while Andersen and Toulemonde
(2004) show that in order for a shock to aﬀect output, it must be of intermediate size while price-adjustment
costs must be large relative to quantity-adjustment costs.
4 Consistent with the model, Bils (2005) ﬁnd that the average stockout rate is about 9% for consumer
durables.
2without quantity-adjustment costs as well as from the no-inventory case with quantity-
adjustment costs. For instance, it is necessary to determine when it is optimal to stock out,
and the discounted marginal real revenue from an increase in production (which equals the
discounted marginal real cost at the optimal production) includes the real revenue from the
later sale of the additional inventory produced in the ﬁrst part of the period.
The model in this paper nests both the original menu-cost model that allows production
to be costlessly adjusted, thereby obviating the need for inventory, and the later model
that includes price- and quantity-adjustment costs, but rules out inventory holdings by
assumption. Thus, the present model not only remedies the limitations of earlier models,
but in addition contains a unifying framework for analyzing the consequences of a ﬁrm’s
optimal pricing and output strategy under all the various alternative assumptions about the
cost of adjusting production and the possibility of holding inventory.5
The paper also provides a numerical illustration of the output eﬀect of allowing for
inventory holdings. Based on realistic parameter values, it is shown that production is
considerably higher with inventories than in their absence. This is true even at very high
levels of inventory-carrying costs. Accordingly, inventories may play an important role in
reducing the output loss from inﬂation when quantity adjustments are costly.
2 The Firm
Consider a ﬁrm with an elastic demand function D(zt), where zt is the real price of the
p r o d u c ta tt i m et. The real production cost is k>0 per unit of output. There is a constant
rate of inﬂation µ>0. Price and quantity adjustments involve a ﬁx e dc o s t ,w h i c hp r e v e n t s
the ﬁrm from adjusting its nominal price and production continuously. The ﬁxed cost of
quantity adjustment at least equals the ﬁxed cost of price adjustment. This implies, as will
be shown below, that the ﬁrm’s production will remain unchanged at a permanent level
while its nominal price will be kept constant in periods of equal length. At the end of each
period the nominal price is increased so that all periods start with the same initial real
5 On the other hand, to make the model manageable, we follow the literature in assuming that the
demand for the ﬁrm’s product is stationary, which eﬀectively rules out that consumers store the good or
substitute intertemporally in consumption, and that the real production cost is constant over time, i.e., that
the ﬁrm’s input prices are ﬂexible.
3price. Consequently, when the real price is relatively high at the beginning of a period, the
ﬁrm produces more than it can sell and accumulates inventory. But when the real price is
relatively low later in the period, demand exceeds production and the inventory helps the
ﬁrm to postpone and possibly eliminate stockouts.
To describe the ﬁrm’s adjustment strategy, let S denote the initial real price of a good in
a period with a constant nominal price, T the duration of a period, and Y the production.
Accordingly, if the nominal price is adjusted at time zero, it will remain constant in [0,T)a n d
the next adjustment of the nominal price will take place at time T.I n ﬂation reduces the real
price of the good to zτ = Se−µτ after τ of the period has elapsed such that the terminal real
price is s ≡ Se−µT. Since the real price decreases within a period with a constant nominal
price, the initial real price and the production will not be set so low that there is excess
demand at the beginning of a period. Neither will the initial real price and the production
be set so high, and the period so short, that the ﬁrm will hold a positive inventory at the end
of the period. If demand exceeds the current production, the ﬁrm satisﬁes demand as long
as there is an inventory from which sales can be made. Accordingly, if δ is the depreciation











−µτ)]dτ =0 , (1)
and at which time the inventory is exhausted. It is assumed that δ ∈ (−r,∞), where r>0
is the real interest rate.6 If TI <T,t h e nd e m a n di ss a t i s ﬁed in the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h ep e r i o d
when τ ∈ [0,T I), while stockouts occur in the second part of the period when τ ∈ [TI,T). If
TI = T,t h e nd e m a n di ss a t i s ﬁed during the entire period.
When the ﬁrm accumulates inventory, it pays the production cost concurrently while
receiving the revenue from sales only later. Accordingly, the inventory-carrying cost consists
of the storage cost due to the depreciation of goods held in inventory and the real interest
on the production cost incurred for later sales.
6 It is natural to think of δ as being non-negative, but allowing for negative δ’s makes the framework
more general. In particular, it will be shown later that the extreme case of δ = −r is equivalent to a model
with price-adjustment costs and no quantity-adjustment costs.
43T h e P r o ﬁtF u n c t i o n
Let zI ≡ Se−µTI denote the real price corresponding to TI.D e m a n di ss a t i s ﬁed for all real
prices above zI, but is not otherwise. Since TI <Timplies that zI >s ,i tf o l l o w st h a t
if s<z I,t h eﬁrm sells D(zt)w h e nzt ∈ (zI,S], but only sells the current production Y
(leaving D(zt) − Y of demand unsatisﬁed) when zt ∈ (s,zI]. In contrast, if s = zI,t h eﬁrm
always sells D(zt). Accordingly, the ﬁrm’s instantaneous real proﬁti s

   
   
ztD(zt) − kY if zt ∈ (zI,S],
(zt − k)Y if zt ∈ (s,zI].
In Figure 1, the horizontal axis measures the real price and the vertical axis measures the
instantaneous real proﬁt. In the absence of ﬁxed costs of quantity adjustment, production
would be continuously adjusted to satisfy demand. The instantaneous real proﬁt, stemming
solely from the current production, would be (zt−k)D(zt), which is shown by the fully drawn
grey curve. In the presence of a ﬁxed cost of quantity adjustment, however, production
remains unchanged at a permanent level. For a given S and Y , the instantaneous real proﬁt
is shown by the fully drawn black curve.7 Letting zY denote the real price at which demand
equals production, i.e., D(zY)=Y ,it follows that zY ∈ (zI,S) and that the instantaneous
real proﬁta tzY is the same as it would be if production could be continuously adjusted.
At the beginning of a period with a constant nominal price, the real price is so high
that zt ∈ (zY,S], and the demand is less than production so that the ﬁrm accumulates
inventory. Hence, the instantaneous real proﬁt is below that obtained in the absence of a
ﬁxed cost of quantity adjustment. Later in the period, the real price falls to zt ∈ (zI,z Y).
The demand exceeds production but the ﬁrm satisﬁes demand by selling from its inventory.
The instantaneous real proﬁt is above that obtained in the absence of a ﬁxed cost of quantity
adjustment and increases with time.
If s<z I,t h e r ei saﬁnal part of the period where the real price falls below zI to
zt ∈ (s,zI]. The ﬁrm has then depleted its inventory and can only sell the current production.
7 The ﬁgure assumes that the production exceeds the initial demand so that zI <S . T h i si sc l e a r l y
satisﬁed if the ﬁrm’s strategy does not involve stockouts, and footnote 8 below veriﬁes that it is also satisﬁed
if the ﬁrm’s strategy does involve stockouts.
5Accordingly, the instantaneous real proﬁt drops discontinuously at zI as the ﬁrm stocks out.
In this range of prices, therefore, the instantaneous real proﬁt is linear in the real price and
b e l o ww h a ti tw o u l db ei nt h ea b s e n c eo faﬁxed cost of quantity adjustment (as long as
the real price exceeds k), and it vanishes as the real price reaches k. On the other hand, if
s = zI, then the real price never falls below zI.T h eﬁrm always satisﬁes all demand, since
the nominal price is increased at the moment the inventory gets depleted.
The instantaneous real proﬁt at the beginning of the period when the ﬁrm has not started
to sell from inventory, i.e., when zt ∈ [zY,S] ,i st h es a m ea si tw o u l db ei ft h e r ew e r en o
possibility of holding inventory. The instantaneous real proﬁt is, however, higher when the
ﬁrm sells from inventory, i.e., when zt ∈ (zI,z Y), since the instantaneous real proﬁtw o u l d
then be only (zt−k)Y if there were no possibility of holding inventory. This is shown by the
dashed grey line in Figure 1. If s<z I, then there is a ﬁnal part of the period when the ﬁrm
only sells its current production, i.e., when zt ∈ (s,zI], and the instantaneous real proﬁti s
then the same as it would be if there were no possibility of holding inventory.
4 The Optimal Adjustment Strategy
At the time of a price adjustment, the ﬁrm’s discounted real proﬁts from the period with a















where c>0i st h eﬁxed real cost of a price adjustment. The ﬁrst term is the discounted real
revenue from the part of the period when the ﬁrm satisﬁes demand and the instantaneous
real revenue is Se−µτD(Se−µτ). The second term is the discounted real revenue from the
part of the period when the ﬁrm stocks out and the instantaneous real revenue is SYe−µτ.
If TI = T, the second term vanishes since the ﬁrm never stocks out. The third term is the
discounted real production cost for the entire period.






















6Assuming that the ﬁrm’s production will remain unchanged at a permanent level, the ﬁrm’s
optimal adjustment strategy consists of a choice of S, T,a n dY that maximizes V ,g i v e n
the deﬁnition of TI in the inventory constraint (1) and that TI ≤ T.8 To verify that the
ﬁrm will in fact never want to change its production given that the ﬁxed cost of quantity
adjustment at least equals c, suppose that the ﬁrm starts with the optimal S and Y at time
t = 0. Adjusting production before time T (alone or concomitantly with an adjustment of
the nominal price) is at least as expensive as making the real price equal to S by adjusting
only the nominal price. However, the latter strictly dominates since the ﬁrm would start the
new period with the optimal S and Y . It follows then that it will never be optimal for the
ﬁrm to adjust its production.
In the following, we ﬁrst analyze the case in which an optimal adjustment strategy
involves stockouts, and next, the case in which it does not.
4.1 The Optimal Adjustment Strategy with Stockouts
An optimal adjustment strategy that involves stockouts, TI <T, (derived in Appendix A)
satisﬁes
SD(S)+zI[Y − D(S)]e
−(r+δ)TI − sY − rc =0 , (3)














−rτdτ =0 . (5)
The production at the time of price adjustment increases the ﬁrm’s real revenue by
the immediate sale of D(S) at the initial real price S, and the later sale of the remaining
production net of depreciation, i.e., [Y −D(S)]e−δTI, at the real price zI at time TI when the
inventories would otherwise have been exhausted. Had the nominal price not been adjusted,
the same production would instead have increased the real revenue by the immediate sale of
Y at the terminal real price s. Condition (3) shows that the initial real price is determined
such that the discounted instantaneous real revenue from the sale of the production at the
time of price adjustment equals what the instantaneous real revenue would be without a
price adjustment plus rc, which is the real interest saved by postponing the cost of price
adjustment.
8 It is assumed that V ≥ 0s ot h a tt h eﬁrm will remain in business.
7According to condition (4), the length of a period with a constant nominal price is such
that the instantaneous terminal real proﬁt equals the real interest on V . The condition
entails that at the time of price adjustment the value of the optimal strategy is the same as
if the ﬁrm would earn the instantaneous terminal real proﬁta ta l lt i m e s .I ta l s oe n t a i l st h a t
the terminal real price at least equals the real production cost, s ≥ k.
If production increases, then all of the additional output in the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h ep e r i o d
until time TI, i.e.,
R TI
0 e−δτdτ net of depreciation, would be sold at the real price zI at time TI,
while the additional output at any time in the second part of the period from time TI until
time T w o u l db es o l da tt h ec o n t e m p o r a n e o u sr e a lp rice. Hence, the discounted marginal real
revenue from the increased production in [0,T I)i szIe−rTI R TI
0 e−δτdτ, and from the increased
production in [TI,T)i sS
R T
TI e−(µ+r)τdτ. Condition (5) therefore expresses that the level of
production is such that, for the entire period, the discounted marginal real revenue equals
the discounted marginal real cost, i.e., k
R T
0 e−rτdτ.9
4.2 The Optimal Adjustment Strategy without Stockouts
An optimal adjustment strategy that does not involve stockouts, TI = T,( d e r i v e di nA p -
pendix A) satisﬁes
SD(S)+kT[Y − D(S)]e
−(r+δ)T − sD(s)+kT[D(s) − Y ] − rc =0 , (6)
sD(s) − kY − kT[D(s) − Y ] − rV =0 , (7)




0 e−δτdτ is the real cost of having an additional unit available at
the end of the period.
Of its production at the time of price adjustment, the ﬁrm immediately sells D(S),
from which it obtains the instantaneous real revenue SD(S). The ﬁrm also inventories
Y − D(S), allowing it to reduce the level of production throughout the period and thereby
save kT[Y −D(S)]e−(r+δ)T in discounted real production costs in the period. If the nominal
price had been kept unchanged, the ﬁrm would have had to sell D(s) to satisfy all demand,
and it would have obtained the instantaneous real revenue sD(s). Since selling D(s)w o u l d
have required the availability of D(s) − Y of inventoried output from the previous period,
9 Condition (5) conﬁrms that zI <S ,s i n c es>kimplies that the left-hand side of the condition would
always be positive for TI =0 .
8production would have had to be higher in that period, and an additional kT[Y − D(s)]
in discounted real production costs would have been incurred in that period. According to
condition (6), the initial real price is determined so that the gain from a price adjustment
equals the gain from keeping the nominal price unchanged plus the real interest saved by
delaying the price adjustment.
The instantaneous real proﬁt attributable to sales at the terminal real price is the diﬀer-
ence between the instantaneous real revenue from the sale of D(s) and the total discounted
cost of producing enough so that D(s) can be sold. Condition (7) indicates that a price ad-
justment takes place when the instantaneous real proﬁt attributable to sales at the terminal
real price equals the real interest on V .
4.3 When Are Stockouts Optimal?
In order to determine whether the optimal adjustment strategy involves stockouts, note
that if TI <Tand there are stockouts, then the discounted marginal real revenue from an
increase in production decreases in TI (for a given S and T).10 The reason is that the ﬁrm
has to wait until TI before it can beneﬁt from selling the last of its inventory and start to
beneﬁt from the higher production when there is excess demand. It follows then that if T is











or, equivalently, s<k T.
Accordingly, if the terminal real price is less than the real cost of having an additional
unit available at the end of a period, s<k T,i td o e sn o tp a yf o rt h eﬁrm to produce so
much that it avoids stocking out at the end of the period, and TI <Tis optimal. But if the
terminal real price at least equals the real cost of the additional unit, s ≥ kT,i ti sp r o ﬁtable
for the ﬁrm to produce enough to always satisfy demand, and TI = T is optimal.11
10 The partial derivative of the left-hand side of condition (5) with respect to TI is




11 If TI = T and s = kT, conditions (3)-(4) are identical to conditions (6)-(7). If s>k T, condition (7)
95 The Optimal Adjustment Strategy at Low Inﬂation
We ﬁr s te s t a b l i s ht h a tt h eﬁrm stocks out and how its production depends on the inﬂation
rate.
Theorem 1: At low inﬂation rates TI <Tand dY/dµ < 0.
Proof: See Appendix B.
At low inﬂation rates the nominal price is kept unchanged for so long that the entire
inventory is sold and stockouts occur at the end of a period with a constant nominal price.
The logic is that at low inﬂation rates the nominal price is kept constant for long periods,
and hence the ﬁrm would have to keep inventory for so long that it would be unproﬁtable
to satisfy demand at the end of the period. Furthermore, production decreases with the
inﬂation rate, since discounting puts more weight on the real proﬁts at the beginning of a
period than on the real proﬁts at the end. At low inﬂation rates, therefore, it is particularly
important for the ﬁrm to increase its instantaneous real proﬁts at the beginning of a period,
which requires reducing production and the accumulation of inventory. Consequently, the
ﬁrm produces less than it would under full price stability.12
We next establish how the length of time demand is satisﬁed depends on the demand
elasticity at the monopoly real price (denoted by  ), the depreciation rate, and the interest
rate.
Theorem 2: At low inﬂation rates dTI/d  > 0; dTI/dδ < 0; and dTI/dr < 0.
Proof: See Appendix C.
T h el e n g t ho ft i m ed e m a n di ss a t i s ﬁed increases with the demand elasticity at the
monopoly real price when the inﬂation rate is low, the reason being that at low inﬂation
rates the discounted marginal real revenue decreases with the length of time demand is sat-
isﬁed and increases with the initial real price (which is close to the monopoly real price),
while the discounted marginal real cost is independent of both the length of time demand
shows that the instantaneous real proﬁt from the terminal production is less than the real interest on V ;
that is, (s − k)Y< r V .
12 In contrast, in a model with price-adjustment costs only, a ﬁrm, on average, produces more than under
full price stability. The reason is that since the initial real price is close to the monopoly real price and the
periods with a constant nominal price are very lengthy, the real price is below the monopoly real price most
of the time. Hence, the output is above the static monopoly output most of the time (Danziger, 1988).
10is satisﬁed and the initial real price. Accordingly, the length of time demand is satisﬁed is
positively related to the monopoly real price. Since the monopoly real price increases with
the demand elasticity, a higher demand elasticity is associated with a longer length of time
demand is satisﬁed.
On the other hand, the length of time demand is satisﬁed decreases with the storage cost
and the real interest rate. This is not surprising as the cost of carrying inventory increases
with the storage cost and the real interest rate, and in order to economize on this cost, the
i n v e n t o r y ,a n dh e n c et h el e n g t ho ft i m ed e m a n di ss a t i s ﬁed, decreases with the storage cost
and the real interest rate.13
6 The Optimal Adjustment Strategy at High Inﬂation
To establish that stockouts occur at high inﬂation rates, observe that there exists a high
inﬂation rate for which V = 0. Condition (4) reveals that at this high inﬂation rate the
terminal real price s equals the production cost k, and hence s<k T.14 Since the optimal
strategy is continuous in µ,i tf o l l o w st h a tTI must be less than T at suﬃciently high inﬂation
rates, which implies that inventories are exhausted and stockouts occur in the last part of
a period with a constant nominal price. The intuition is that there is only a minor gap
between the real price and the production cost towards the end of a period with a constant
nominal price. Given the inventory-carrying cost, it is not proﬁtable for the ﬁrm to keep
goods in inventory for so long that demand is satisﬁed until the end of the period.15
13 A comprehensive analysis of uncertainty is beyond the scope of the present paper, but it is not too
complicated to ascertain how a single unexpected productivity shock would aﬀect output. Thus, if a produc-
tivity shock occurs, then condition (5), which requires that the level of production equalizes the discounted
marginal real revenue and the discounted marginal real cost in the entire period, would no longer be satisﬁed.
If the shock is small, it is not worth it for the ﬁrm to incur the ﬁxed quantity-adjustment cost in order to
change the production level. Since conditions (3) and (4) are independent of k, a small productivity shock
would therefore also not cause the ﬁrm to change the time of the next price adjustment, even if this is still
far into the future. However, a large positive or negative shock would cause the ﬁrm to change its production
(perhaps not immediately, but no later than the next time price is adjusted), and move the time of the next
price adjustment. In particular, the ﬁrm might want to immediately adjust both its production and its price.
14 In order for condition (7) to hold for V =0 ,i tw o u l dh a v et ob et h ec a s et h a ts<k T,w h i c hi s
inconsistent with TI = T.
15 The theoretical conclusion that stockouts are prevalent with high inﬂation rates is supported by the
empirical evidence that shortages are positively correlated with the inﬂation rate (Lamont, 1997).
117 Generality of the Model
Although the model assumes that δ ∈ (−r,∞), the optimality conditions are also valid in
the extreme cases where δ equals −r or ∞, as we show in the following.
If δ = −r, stored goods grow at a rate equal to the real interest rate, so there is no
inventory-carrying cost. The discounted production cost is invariant with respect to the
time the goods are produced, and it is immaterial when production takes place. Hence,
kT = k so that s>k T a n di ti sa l w a y so p t i m a lt os a t i s f yd e m a n dt ot h ee n do fap e -
riod. That is, TI = T for all inﬂation rates. Since
R T
0 e−rτD(Se−µτ)dτ = Y
R T
0 e−rτdτ,t h e
case of δ = −r is, in terms of the ﬁrm’s sales and total discounted real proﬁts, equivalent
to the absence of quantity-adjustment costs and production being continuously adjusted.
Accordingly, conditions (6)-(7) reduce to
(S − k)D(S) − (s − k)D(s) − rc =0 ,
(s − k)D(s) − rV =0 ,
which are the optimality conditions in the presence of only price-adjustment costs (Sheshinski
and Weiss, 1977).
On the other hand, if δ = ∞, the output is completely perishable so that unsold goods
a r ew a s t e d .T h ec a s ei se q u i v a l e n tt on o ta l l o w i n gt h eﬁrm to hold inventory. Since kT = ∞
and therefore s<k T, it is always optimal to stock out at the end of a period. That is,
TI <Tfor all inﬂation rates. The ﬁrm’s real revenue from the production at the time of
price adjustment is then due only to the immediate sale of D(S); since there is no revenue
from the unsold Y −D(S), the second term in condition (3) vanishes. Similarly, if production
increases, the increase in real revenue would be due only to the sale of the additional output
in the second part of the period; since there is no revenue from the additional unsold output
in the ﬁrst part of the period, the ﬁrst term in condition (5) vanishes. Conditions (3)-(5)
therefore reduce to
SD(S) − sY − rc =0 ,










12which are the optimality conditions for a non-storable good in the presence of both price-
and quantity-adjustment costs (Danziger, 2001).
The present model therefore captures not only the typical inventory-holding circum-
stances, but nests both the original menu-cost model in which a ﬁrm has no need to hold
inventory because it can costlessly change production, and the later model in which pro-
duction changes are costly and a ﬁrm cannot hold inventory. Thus, our model provides a
unifying framework for analyzing the optimal adjustment strategy and the eﬀects of inﬂa-
tion in both of these extreme cases which have been considered in the previous models, as
well as in the more realistic, intermediate situations in which a ﬁrm faces both price- and
quantity-adjustment costs and can hold inventory.
8 Variable Production
It is also possible to generalize the model by relaxing the assumption that the ﬁxed quantity-
adjustment cost is so high that production will remain constant, and instead assume that
production could be expanded in the short run at a weakly increasing marginal real cost.
Although it would complicate the analysis, the basic results would continue to hold. In
particular, inventories would still play an important role in shaping the ﬁrm’s optimal ad-
justment strategy, although their impact would be mitigated since increased demand could
be satisﬁed not only by drawing down inventories, but also by increasing production. Thus,
there would still exist a time TI at which inventories are exhausted. However, since pro-
duction can now be increased, demand may be satisﬁed also if τ ∈ [TI,T), and there would
exist a time TJ ∈ (TI,T] such that if TJ <T, demand is satisﬁed by increased production if
τ ∈ [TI,T J) and stockouts occur when τ ∈ [TJ,T), while if TJ = T, demand is always satis-
ﬁed. The formal analysis would require deﬁning a time-varying Yt as the ﬁrm’s production
at time t,a n dC(Yt) as the total real production cost when the output is Yt. One would then
substitute Yt for Y in the inventory constraint (1) and make the appropriate changes in the
expression for the total discounted real proﬁts (2) before deriving the optimal adjustment
strategy, which would now include determining production changes within periods with a
constant nominal price.
A particularly simple case would be if the ﬁrm chooses a capacity Y such that the total
real cost is kY as long as production does not exceed the capacity, and the marginal real
13cost is k∗ >kif production exceeds Y . This could, for instance, reﬂe c tt h a tt h eﬁrm cannot
reduce its current work force and that it is necessary to pay overtime or activate less eﬃcient
machinery when production is temporarily increased above capacity. The ﬁrm’s discounted
real proﬁts can be obtained from expression (2) by substituting TJ for TI and adding the
discounted real proﬁts due to the production at the marginal real cost k∗ between TI and

































If k∗ <k T so that k∗ is not so high that the ﬁrm will never produce more than Y (making the





which is the real cost of increasing the capacity to make an additional unit available at TI,
equals k∗.T h eﬁrm will produce Y until its inventories have been exhausted, after which it
will satisfy all demand by increasing production as long as the real price is at least k∗.S i n c e
Se−µτ = k∗ ⇔ τ =( 1 /µ)ln(S/k∗), it follows that TJ =( 1 /µ)ln(S/k∗)i fs<k ∗ and TJ = T
if s ≥ k∗. Consequently, the ﬁrm will stock out before the end of the period if the terminal
r e a lp r i c ei sl e s st h a nk∗, but not if the terminal real price is at least k∗.
9 A Numerical Illustration
To assess the importance of inventories for the inﬂation-output relationship, suppose the
demand function is D(zt)=z
−10
t , the unit production cost is k = 1, the real interest rate is
r = 3%, and the cost of price adjustment is c =9 9/1011.16
Table 1 lists the percentage loss of production (relative to the static monopoly output)
due to inﬂation both when there is no storage cost and at various levels of storage cost.17
16 The demand function implies a markup (ratio of price to marginal cost) of 10/9, which is consistent
with estimated markups that are typically between 1.1 and 1.2 (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1995; Basu and
Fernald, 1997). The cost of price adjustment is about 1% of the static monopoly revenue, and thus between
0.7% as found by Levy et al. (1997) and 1.22% as found by Zbaracki et al. (2004). Sensitivity analysis (not
reported here) shows that broadly similar results would hold with other constant-elasticity demand functions
and unit production costs.
14The ﬁrm’s optimal strategy always involves accumulation of inventory at the beginning of a
period with a constant nominal price. For the combinations of inﬂation rates and storage
costs marked by an asterisk, the accumulated inventory is not large enough to satisfy demand
until the end of the period with the result that the ﬁrm eventually stocks out. Thus, the
table veriﬁes that the ﬁr ms t o c k so u ta tl o wi n ﬂation rates. Since Section 6 has proved that
at high inﬂation rates the ﬁrm also stocks out at the end of the period, the table shows
that at intermediate values of the inﬂation rates the inventory may be suﬃcient to satisfy
demand until the end of the period.
The output loss always increases with inﬂation. A higher storage cost, which increases
the cost of carrying inventory, is associated with a lower production at all levels of inﬂation.
However, the output loss is much reduced compared to what it would be if the ﬁrm could
not hold inventory (shown in the penultimate column of Table 1). For instance, if there is
no storage cost, the loss is only about a third or less of what the loss would be if there were
no possibility of holding inventory. At a realistic storage cost of δ =2 0 %a n di n ﬂation rates
of 5% or higher, the loss is less than half of what it would be if the ﬁrm could not hold
inventory. Even if the storage cost is δ = 50% and the inﬂation rate is 10% or higher, the
loss is only a little more than half of what it would be if the ﬁrm could not hold inventory.
On the other hand, the output loss is higher than what the loss of average output would
be with price-adjustment costs only and production continuously adjusted to satisfy demand
(shown in the last column of Table 1). Indeed, in this case, at an inﬂation rate of 1%, there
would be a minor gain of average output.18
10 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the optimal adjustment strategy of a ﬁrm faced with ﬁxed price-
and quantity-adjustment costs in an inﬂationary environment. An important innovation
17 Estimated inventory-carrying costs, which include the real interest, are on average 25% (Stock and
Lambert, 2001).
18 See footnote 11. Since sales and consumption with quantity-adjustment costs and the cost of storage
given by δ = −r are the same as with price-adjustment costs only, the last column also shows the loss/gain
of average consumption (which is diﬀerent from output) if there were only price-adjustment costs. The gain
of average consumption is made possible by the fact that average sales exceed production if δ<0. As shown
in Theorem 1, the production and the inﬂation rate are inversely related at low inﬂation rates also if δ<0.
15of the model is that the ﬁrm may keep its unsold production in inventory for later sales.
This makes the framework more realistic than previous models that have abstracted from
inventories by assuming that any unsold output is immediately destroyed. In fact, the model
is quite general since it nests both the original menu-cost model without costs of quantity
adjustment and the later model that includes costs of quantity adjustment but makes no
allowance for inventories.
The single-ﬁrm model could be embedded in a general-equilibrium model of monopolistic
competition with many ﬁrms, assuming a uniform distribution of the lengths of time since
the ﬁrms’ last price adjustments. It would then be simple to verify that the behavior of the
aggregate output would be similar to that of the partial-equilibrium output of a single ﬁrm.
Welfare would, therefore, bel o w e rw i t has l o wr a t eo fi n ﬂa t i o nt h a na tas t a b l ep r i c el e v e l
due to the reduction in production and the cost of carrying inventory.
16Appendix A
Derivation of the Optimal Adjustment Strategy
First, to determine the optimal adjustment strategy if stockouts are optimal, assume that

















































D(zI) − D(S)e−δTI − Y (1 − e−δTI)

















































































































−(r+δ)TI − sY − rc




An optimal adjustment strategy with stockouts therefore satisﬁes
SD(S)+zI[Y − D(S)]e
−(r+δ)TI − sY − rc =0 ,















Next, to determine the optimal adjustment strategy if stockouts are not optimal, assume

























{sD(s) − kY − kT[D(s) − Y ] − rV} =0 ,












































SD(S) − sD(s)e−rT − rV(1 − e−rT) − kY(1 − e−rT) − rc






SD(S)+kT[Y − D(S)]e−(r+δ)T − sD(s)+kT[D(s) − Y ] − rc
+{sD(s) − kY − kT[D(s) − Y ] − rV}(1 − e−rT)
´
.
An optimal adjustment strategy without stockouts therefore satisﬁes
SD(S)+kT[Y − D(S)]e−(r+δ)T − sD(s)+kT[D(s) − Y ] − rc =0 ,
sD(s) − kY − kT[D(s) − Y ] − rV =0 .
Appendix B
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof that TI <T:I f t h e i n ﬂation rate converges to zero, the initial real price and the
production converge to the static monopoly real price Z and output D(Z), where Z is deﬁned
by Z + D(Z)/D0(Z)=k. The length of a period with a constant nominal price diverges to
inﬁnity and the total discounted real proﬁts converge to (Z − k)D(Z)/r − c. Accordingly,
condition (4) shows that (limµ→0 s − k)D(Z) − (Z − k)D(Z)+rc = 0 so that the terminal
real price converges to limµ→0 s = Z − rc/D(Z), which is ﬁnite. The marginal real cost
of a unit, discounted to the end of a period, diverges to inﬁnity. Thus, in the limit the
terminal real price is less than the marginal real cost of a unit discounted to the end of a
period, Z − rc/D(Z) <k ∞. It follows that ˆ TI ≡ limµ→0 TI is ﬁnite (if ˆ TI were inﬁnite, then
the discounted marginal real revenue would be zero and less than the discounted marginal
real cost k/r). Since the optimal strategy is continuous in µ,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a t
s<k T ⇒ TI <Tat low inﬂation rates.
Proof that dY/dµ < 0: I ti sﬁrst established that production decreases with the cost of
price adjustment at small inﬂation rates (where TI <T ). Diﬀerentiate conditions (3)-(5)








A ≡ (µ + r + δ)e
−µTI
"

































using eq. (A1), and B<0 from the second-order condition for a maximum. Accordingly,
dY/dc has the same sign as A. At small inﬂation rates, therefore, dY/dc < 0i fl i m µ→0 A<0.
Now,
lim






















−(ˆ s − k)
h
D(Z)e








Let TY be the time at which demand equals production, and ˆ TY the limit of TY as the
inﬂation rate approaches zero. That is, TY ≡ (1/µ)ln(S/zY)a n dˆ TY ≡ limµ→0 TY.E x p a n d










D(Se−µTI) − D(S)e−δTI − D(Se−µTY )(1 − e−δTI)





−D0(Se−µTI)Se−µTIµTI + D0(Se−µTI)Se−µTY µTY(1 − e−δTI)
−D0(Se−µTI)Se−µTIµTI + D0(Se−µTY )Se−µTY µTY
#
=
ˆ TI − ˆ TY(1 − e−δ ˆ TI)

































− k =0 ,
which by use of the deﬁnition of Z becomes
D(Z)e




r ˆ TI − e
−δ ˆ TI
´











ˆ TI − ˆ TY(1 − e−δ ˆ TI)




















I [ZD0(Z)(ˆ s − k)+ˆ sD(Z)]
ˆ TI − ˆ TY
= −
r ˆ T2
I D(Z)k(Z − ˆ s)
(ˆ TI − ˆ TY)(Z − k)
< 0,
where the last equality uses that D0(Z)=−D(Z)/(Z − k) ⇒ ZD0(Z)(ˆ s − k)+ˆ sD(Z)=
kD(Z)(Z − ˆ s)/(Z − k). It can be concluded that dY/dc < 0 at small inﬂation rates. Since
production converges to D(Z)a st h ei n ﬂation rate approaches zero, production is less than
the static monopoly output at small inﬂation rates, Y< D (Z). For this to be the case,





Real price k zI zYTABLE 1 — PERCENTAGE LOSS/GAIN OF OUTPUT
Price- and quantity-adjustment cost
Inventory storage cost






































Notes: All numbers are in per cent.
An asterisk indicates that ﬁrms eventually stock out.References
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